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Abstract 
This article considers the politics of affect and official discourses of ‘9/11’. 
Drawing on the work of William Connolly and others, it is argued that to 
understand the resonance of dominant constructions of ‘9/11’ it is necessary to 
revisit their successful incorporation of prevalent American affective 
experiences of September 11th. To date, this relationship between affect, 
resonance, and discourse has been underexplored in International Relations. Its 
investigation offers important empirical insights on resonance, as well as 
theoretical innovation in connecting established work on narrative and 
discourse with emerging work on bioculture and affect. To this end, the article 
introduces a framework for the future analysis of affect, culture and discourse 
within International Relations. The article concludes, however, that, 
notwithstanding its importance to resonance, in ‘crisis’ situations such as ‘9/11’, 
affect is what states make of it. 
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Affect is What States Make of it: 




This article considers the affective politics of ‘9/11’, by mobilising the theoretical 
constructs of culture, affect and discourse. The article reflects on the relationship 
between cultural context, affective experience and discursive construction – a 
key relationship that remains underdeveloped in IR. This relationship has 
substantial theoretical and empirical implications for what have become two of 
the field’s most employed concepts – identity and discourse. The concept of 
discourse is key to understanding the social constructed-ness of foreign policy 
and is also a crucial link in the complex relationship between affect and emotion. 
Moreover, this relationship holds normative implications for understanding and 
contesting the logic of the ‘War on Terror’. Drawing on the work of William 
Connolly and others, we see that the political possibility of foreign policy is 
partially determined in the relationship between affective experience and 
discursive construction. In short, the article argues that the political possibility of 
foreign policy is partially determined by the role of affective investment, which is 
presently underexplored in International Relations, despite its centrality to 
issues of resonance and discursive dominance.  
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The article is structured in three sections. First, the article defines the key terms 
used and theorises the ways in which culture, affect and discourse relate. We 
outline the importance of affect, the interpenetration of biology and culture, and 
the centrality of building on everyday experience in the crafting of resonant 
discourse. Second, after a discussion of the key concepts, the affective, cultural 
and discursive elements of the American response to ‘9/11’ are outlined in turn. 
Within the latter, the bioculturally embedded production of the official American 
construction of ‘9/11’ is traced through four empirical examples of how the 
official "War on Terror” discourse resonated with and in many ways helped to 
account for American audiences’ affective experiences of the 9/11 attacks. Third, 
we bring our theoretical and empirical contributions together in order to deliver 
the argument that, while affect matters and must be taken seriously, the state 
retains a significant ability to articulate affect as emotion in the construction of 
resonant discourses.  
 
Our argument hinges on this process of naming affect as emotion. We argue that 
the political possibility of foreign policy is partially determined through the 
affective investment of the national audience within it. Affect, then, is certainly 
key and often overlooked: it shapes foreign policy discourses and popular 
responses to events, as well as sustaining them at a visceral level. Often, 
however, and especially in moments of crisis such as 9/11, the state retains an 
ability to articulate affect as emotion – affect is what states make of it – and this 
is key to enabling a particular foreign policy response. This article therefore 
makes a contribution to literatures attempting to understand the reaction to 
9/11, through the development of a framework for conceptualising the 
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relationship of affect, emotion and discourse, as well as by highlighting the role 
(and power) of the state in this relationship.  
 
Building on Experience: Affect, Biology, Culture, Discourse, Emotion 
(ABCDE) 
The Bush administration did not write ‘9/11’ and the ‘War on Terror’ on a social 
blank slate, but rather actively and persuasively plugged into the affective, 
emotional and cultural landscape carved out by the events of September 11th. It 
has become commonplace in works discussing ‘culture’ to lament that this is one 
of the most complex words in the English language (Williams 1983). To 
compound matters, affect and emotion are not particularly straightforward 
either. In recent years there has been a growing interest in the roles of affect and 
emotion in world politics (Crawford, 2000; Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008; Mercer, 
2010; Ross, 2006).1 Some of these scholars draw a distinction between affect and 
emotion, arguing that they are best understood as separate yet related concepts. 
For example, Sasley (2010: 689) conceptualizes affect as “one aspect of 
emotions” which refers to general valences of positive or negative feelings 
towards an object and thus often functions as a heuristic for decision making. 
Similarly, Ross distinguishes between more “coherent ‘feelings’ such as 
vengeance or anger” and “affective energies” that are more nebulous yet often no 
less politically consequential (Ross, 2006: 212). Hutchison (2010: 84) contends 
that “affect is different from an emotion in that an emotion is an intense feeling 
that characterises one’s state of mind” whereas affect is “an inner disposition or 
                                                        
1 See also the recent forum on emotions and security in Critical Studies on 
Security 2013, 1(1).   
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feeling” or “mood”. While these conceptualizations are helpful, they nevertheless 
downplay the tricky relationship of affect and emotion to political discourse. It is 
important to think more specifically about the entangling linkages between all 
three phenomena. In this task, Shouse is helpful: 
‘Although… routinely used interchangeably, it is important not to confuse 
affect with emotions … Feelings are personal and biographical, emotions 
are social, and affects are prepersonal’ (Shouse, 2005; see also Massumi 
2007). 
Solomon draws upon Lacanian theory to conceptualise the relationship between 
affect, emotion and discourse, and helps to clarify the affect-emotion distinction 
further: 
‘…emotions result when extra-discursive affect is translated into 
recognizable emotional signifiers within discourse. Affect is understood 
here as amorphous potential that remains outside of discourse, which is 
difficult to articulate but nevertheless has effects within discourse. 
Emotion, on the other hand, can be viewed as the “feeling” that signifiers 
“represent” once names are attached to affect, thereby conferring on them 
discursive reality’ (Solomon, 2012: 908). 
Affect, then, is seen to be somehow beyond and before discourse. Although a 
form of ‘feeling’, affect occurs prior to the thinking of and about ‘feeling’; despite 
being neurological, affect is a largely non-conscious process as opposed to 
consciously-registered cognitive feelings. Feeling entails a degree of self-analysis 
and contemplation that affect does not. Affect is often more associated with 
bodily (biological) senses and pre-conscious reactions that occur just prior to 
cognitive awareness. Drawing together these insights, then, affect is the initial 
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component and mediation of experience by the body and the brain. Emotion is 
that symbolic intersubjective process of categorising the apparent ‘feelings’ that 
later reflection upon affect names. Discourse is, of course, one such way in which 
intersubjective notions are shared and mutually agreed upon. Emotions such as 
‘sadness’ and ‘anger’, for example, were central to the discursive construction of 
‘9/11’ by the Bush Administration and the wider culture (Jackson, 2005). They 
helped to name affective experiences of September 11th which were initially 
more frequently categorised around more nebulous notions such as ‘lack’ and 
‘shock’, as discussed below. While this is a complex relationship, it can be 
helpfully thought of as “ABCDE”. Affect is a Biological response to an event, which 
is conditioned by Culture, and later named within Discourse as Emotion. Affect, 
therefore, is that experience of an event, which is biological, cultural and 
somehow before and beyond its discursive articulation. 
 
The complex linkages between these factors have largely gone underexplored in 
IR. While there is much work that has drawn upon and conceptually elaborated 
the concepts of culture and discourse, and a growing literature analysing the 
politics of affects and emotions, it is theoretically fruitful to examine how these 
factors permeate each other and thus more comprehensively understand how 
they reinforce each other in constituting collective understandings and in 
producing political outcomes. Culture, for example, is defined in one prominent 
IR text as “the context within which people give meanings to their actions and 
experiences and make sense of their lives” (Weldes et al., 1999: 1). Another 
defines it as “a set of evaluative standards, such as norms or values” and 
“cognitive standards” such as social rules (Jepperson et al., 1996: 56). While 
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useful in pointing attention towards social and ideational factors (beyond strictly 
materialist and rationalist factors), most of these approaches to culture in IR 
tend to downplay the affective aspects that sustain many dimensions of culture, 
and are often not synonymous with the more cognitive elements that these 
definitions emphasize (see Lapid and Kratochwil, 1995; Lebow, 2009). 
 
Similarly, as many in IR have detailed, discourse is often defined as “framings of 
meaning and lenses of interpretation, rather than objective, historical truths” 
(Hansen, 2006: 7), or as “structures of signification which construct social 
realities” rather than being naturally given (Milliken, 1999: 229). Language is 
viewed as “a system of differential signs, and meaning is not established by the 
essence of a thing itself but through a series of juxtapositions, where one element 
is valued over its opposite” (Hansen, 2006: 19). While much of this work rightly 
focuses on exposing the contingency of political discourses and aims to 
demonstrate the relational construction of meaning through the differential 
juxtaposition of signifiers, it also tends to neglect precisely how discourses 
affectively resonate among receiving audiences. Moreover, it implicitly tends to 
equate meaning with linguistic and symbolic systems, rather than unpacking the 
pre-discursive affective responses which often give rise to signifiers and 
discourses which attempt to name – and attach meaning to – such affective 
responses (see Campbell, 1998; Doty, 1993; Hansen, 2011).  
 
This is also what the above framework adds to current understandings of affect 
in IR. If, as some IR scholars argue, a useful distinction is made between affect 
and emotion, their relationship still remains unclear in many of these accounts. 
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Importantly, extant work has also largely yet to analyze how affect potentially 
transforms into emotion. This is key because, as Ross argues, “investigating these 
[affective] processes differs from existing research on emotional dimensions of 
identity by relaxing the expectation that such emotions involve reflection and 
meaning” (Ross, 2006: 210; Ross 2014). Additionally, investigating the potential 
transformation of affect into emotion via discourse takes us closer to 
understanding the frameworks of discursive and symbolic power that many in IR 
have emphasized (see Williams, 2007).  The empirical payoff here holds 
considerable promise.  Conceptualizing these links between biological affect, 
culture, discourse, and emotion contributes a crucial yet neglected factor in the 
literature that explains the US war on terror policies by recourse to its discursive 
construction. As illustrated below, discourse approaches in IR and FPA should 
more thoroughly account for the ways in which affective reactions are intimately 
linked to discourse and how the naming of emotions often results from this 
entanglement, thus producing resonant and often hegemonic discourses.  
 
Two points require further elaboration. First, we do not wish to imply that this is 
a simple, linear process suggesting (Humean) causation. Rather, our framework 
represents a deliberately parsimonious attempt to conceptualise these 
interwoven elements in order to redress persistent oversights and conflations. 
Second, and relatedly, our understanding of resonance draws on two literatures. 
Resonance is certainly achieved through appeal and acceptance by an audience 
(e.g. Balzacq 2005; Barnett 1999, Holland 2013); and it involves the infiltration 
and amplification of discourses as they ‘dissolve into each other’ (Connolly 2005: 
870). Building on Connolly, we suggest that resonance can be achieved through 
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the blending and dissolution of textual and non-textual (i.e. affective) elements, 
such that they form ‘qualitative assemblages’: ‘complexities of mutual 
imbrication and interinvolvement’ (ibid.). As Protevi (2010: 1, our emphasis) 
notes, it is important to acknowledge the ‘assemblage as the imbrication of the 
social and the somatic’. Affective investment, we argue, is an important and 
sometimes overlooked process through which these assemblages are formed and 
resonance achieved. 
 
Affect, Culture, Discourse and 9/11 
Experiencing September 11th: Biocultural Affect 
How then do these interlinked factors work? Contra Campbell, for example, who 
argues that “there is nothing outside of discourse” (Campbell, 1998: 4), we 
suggest that September 11th provides us with an interesting empirical case study 
precisely because of those initial moments after 9/11 in which witnesses gasped, 
but could not find the words to articulate their feelings (Holland, 2009; Morris, 
2004; Troyer, 2001), hint at an important avenue of enquiry, which has been 
made apparent by the work of scientist colleagues (Damasio 1999).  
 
A purely discursive analysis risks veiling a crucial component of the meaning-
making process: biocultural affect. The process of framing events to enable and 
encourage understanding does not begin with foreign policy speeches; it begins 
as soon as an event is witnessed and prior to conscious awareness of it. As 
William Connolly (2002), Gerard Toal (2003), Antonio Damasio (1999) and John 
Protevi (2009) argue, this process is essential in everyday life. Affect helps to 
ensure that the infinite complexity of experience is reduced and potential 
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responses to events are rendered comprehensible to the individual, rather than 
appearing as a potentially endless rational-choice marathon of the weighing of 
possibilities. Without this non-conscious shortcut the most inane questions and 
options could be pondered and deliberated indefinitely and potentially without 
conclusion. In this sense, rationality/cognition and affect are mutually 
implicated, rather than affective responses constituting ‘deviations’ from 
cognition.  Cognition is, in other words, ‘both affective and cognitive, with . . . an 
emphasis to be placed on the unconscious affective evaluations that precede’ 
rational calculations (Protevi 2009, 25).   
 
Connolly’s work has been central to the project of understanding the complex 
relationship of affective experience to discursive construction. He has been at the 
forefront of attempts to theorise the relationship of affect, thinking and language, 
through an appreciation of the interpenetration of biology and culture (Connolly 
2002, 2005). Connolly’s project has attempted to break down engrained 
distinctions between nature and culture in favour of ‘interacting layers of 
biocultural complexity’ (Krause, 2006). And, this complexity has been 
increasingly recognised in understandings of foreign policy and international 
relations with recent research taking seriously the role played by ‘emotions’ yet 
without fully developing the ‘zone of indiscernability’ between biology and 
culture that is often at the root of reactions to traumatic events such as 9/11.  
 
For Connolly, the part of the brain and body that enacts affect forms a series of 
loops and counterloops that interact with the rest of the body and with the larger 
culture (Connolly, 2002: 75; see also Thrift 2008). Connolly’s project very 
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directly breaks down the nature/culture distinction in favour of a bioculturally 
layered conception of thought. It is in the ‘middle range of complexity’ between 
nature and culture that we reach a ‘zone of indiscernability’ in which neither 
category of ‘nature’ or ‘culture’ stands on its own (as traditionally envisioned). 
This zone requires and indeed demands ‘much more attention today in cultural 
theory’ (Ibid.: 63-64). As he argues, a ‘multilayered conception of culture and 
thinking is needed… that comes to terms with how biology is mixed… into every 
layer of human culture’ (Ibid.: 62). Material factors such as the body and bodily 
reactions are not “outside” of culture, but rather come to be caught up in its 
multiple layering. For Connolly, the “brain network must both engage the 
linguistically mediated world and respond to multiple signals from the body that 
bear traces of past experiences upon them” (Ibid.). It is out of this nebulous area 
of intermixing of biology and culture that more conscious thoughts, reactions, 
and representations spring.  
 
Connolly’s project then works in two complementary directions: against social 
science blinkered by Enlightenment rationality, through a realisation of the 
importance of affect to political life; and against the linearity and causality of 
misappropriated natural determinism, through a realisation of the layering of 
the cultural in the biological. Importantly, in exploring this complex relationship 
between affect and discourse, Connolly argues that this should not cause concern 
amongst those who rightly focus on the constitutive role of discourse in politics.  
Does attention to the role of affect in the mobility of thought denigrate the 
role of language? Not at all. First, linguistic distinctions, in the largest 
sense of that idea, are differentially mixed into affective states at each 
 13 
level of complexity, even if they do not exhaust them and even if many 
thoughts move too fast to render the linguistic element explicit. Affect 
would be more brutish than it is without language (Ibid.: 73). 
Thus not only is language bound up with affect, but it is also a social medium 
through which affect is expressed into more defined linguistic categories which 
imperfectly express the affective reaction experienced.  
 
Drawing upon these insights, a biocultural reading of September 11th shows us 
how affective experience of events can vary geographically and culturally. 
Worldwide, there were a multiplicity of responses to the events of September 
11th and the related diversity of subsequent constructions. Kleinfeld (2003) has 
hinted for example that ‘9/11’ was experienced very differently in Sri Lanka, due 
to a distinct cultural context, replete with more commonplace understandings of 
political violence. Similarly, Holland (2012) argues that Tony Blair’s emphasis on 
the scale of the loss of life, rather than experiencing or expressing shock at the 
events themselves, can be understood with reference to the unique British 
cultural context. Likewise, in Australia there is evidence to suggest that 
September 11th, whilst still shocking, was understood in very different temporal 
terms to the perception of absolute temporal rupture that characterised the 
dominant American experience (Holland, 2010, 2013). Although clearly not 
homogenous, the pervasiveness of American security culture facilitated a 
prevalent affective experience of September 11th in the United States, which is 
demonstrated by a considerable weight of empirical evidence. This prevalent 




Drawing upon Connolly, and building on the work of IR affect scholars, the key 
claim made here is that the affective responses American citizens articulated in 
September 11th’s immediate aftermath attempted to put into words the visceral 
affect that the experience of the events initiated (Ross, 2006; Saurette, 2006; 
Solomon, 2012). This biological affect took place before the words of the Bush 
government began to harmonise understandings of ‘9/11’ around increasingly 
hegemonic framings. However, these biological reactions – of shock and horror – 
were inevitably conditioned by the cultural context in which American citizens 
had learned to expect the everyday.  
 
Conditioning Context: American Security Culture  
Take, for instance, one interviewee’s frank admittance that they ‘felt nothing’, 
because they ‘couldn’t understand’ (Sato, 2001). To understand how this was 
possible, it is necessary to revisit the conditioning context of 1990s America, 
which shaped American expectations of the everyday. The cultural context of 
unipolarity in 1990s America, characterised by self-proclaimed indispensability 
and an American-inspired ‘end of history’, conditioned the prevalent affective 
experience of September 11th (Albright, 1998; Fukuyama, 1992). Culture and 
biology mattered, and it was through their interweaving that the affective 
experience of September 11th was characterised. For instance, as one American 
citizen noted after ‘9/11’, the events had ‘to be set off against what one has been 
conditioned to’ (Fan, 2001). Their fellow American’s frank admittance that they 
‘felt nothing’, because they ‘couldn’t understand’ (Ibid.), is a logical, even likely, 
affective response, given the cultural context in which Americans had learned to 
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expect the everyday.  Indeed, such a response likely indicates the sheer contrast 
with the everyday expectations produced by American security culture and their 
encounter with the events of 9/11 (see Butler 2004). 
 
A particular security culture, which located danger and violence almost 
exclusively outside of America (Campbell, 1998), helped to initially place the 
events of September 11th beyond comprehension for many watching Americans. 
Dealing with foreign policy generally, and the case study of ‘9/11’ specifically, it 
is useful to speak of a predominant American security culture, which helped to 
structure the prevalent affective American response to the events. A security 
culture is a shared body of assumptions, belief and norms, as well as associated 
practices, related to the security of the state and/or other social actors 
(Katzenstein, 1996). Security cultures are thus ‘patterns of thought and 
argumentation that establish pervasive and durable security preferences by 
formulating concepts of the role, legitimacy and efficacy of particular approaches 
to protecting values. Through a process of socialisation, security cultures help 
establish the core assumptions, beliefs and values of decision-makers’ and the 
general public about ‘how security challenges can and should be dealt with’ and, 
more fundamentally, about what is a security challenge or what is likely to 
become one. This definition helps to specify what we mean by ‘culture’ in this 
instance, and how culture conditioned the experience of the events of September 
11th 2001 (Williams, 2007: 279).  
 
In the United States understandings of security have long been conditioned by 
cultural beliefs in the myths and narratives of American exceptionalism. 
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McCrisken argues that American exceptionalism centres on the belief that the 
United States is unique and superior (McCrisken, 2003). It serves as the basis for 
a cultural identity, in accordance with which foreign policy is developed 
(Katzenstein, 1996). The origins of exceptionalism lay in the self-understanding 
of early settlers in the New World. Thomas Paine remarked that ‘we have it in 
our power to begin the world over again’ precisely because, as Thomas Jefferson 
noted, America is ‘kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the 
exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high-minded to endure the 
degradations of others’ (Jefferson, 1801). As Gaddis has argued, it is this physical 
isolation and the security afforded by two vast oceans that enabled Americans to 
reach the zenith of perceived invulnerability in the late 1990s (Gaddis, 2004). A 
notable portion of cultural commentary on US foreign relations during the 1990s 
centered on such notions. Commentators on both the left and right styled the 
1990s as a “holiday from history” and contended that 9/11 awoke Americans 
from “a frivolous if not decadent decade-long dream, even as it dumps us into an 
uncertain future we never bargained for” (Will and Rich, cited in Chollet and 
Goldgeier, 2008: xi). As Chollet and Goldgeier (2008: 316) argue, the “end of the 
Cold War made many Americans and their leaders believe the world had become 
more benign, and therefore, of less concern”. It was this perceived and felt 
invulnerability of the 1990s against which affective reactions and their 
subsequent discursive articulation of September 11th should be understood. 
 
Building on Experience: Affective Responses and Constructing a Resonant Discourse 
It was this cultural context and the security myths of the late 1990s that 
conditioned the prevalent American experience of the events of September 11th. 
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Particular affective responses preceded the Bush Administration’s construction 
of ‘9/11’ which discursively accounted for them. Drawing on interviews 
conducted in the weeks after 9/11 (13 September – 1 November 2001), our 
empirical analysis captures this process of discursive capture, personal 
emotional realignment, and affective investment. Accounting for affect and 
sculpting a narrative that incorporated the visceral experience of September 11th 
was central to the Bush Administration’s attempts to craft a resonant framing of 
‘9/11’. Here, we recount four useful examples, which indicate the embedding of 
the Bush Administration’s official discourse within the post 9/11 biocultural 
landscape. In turn, these examples are: the perceived foreign-ness of the events; 
the understanding that the events represent a moment of temporal rupture; the 
notion that the events were beyond understanding; and the idea that a ‘way of 
life’ had come under threat. In each instance, plugging into and accounting for 
the prevalent affective experience of September 11th helped to ensure the 
cultural and public resonance of official constructions (see Solomon, 2012). 
 
(i) 9/11 as Foreign  
The first useful example of ‘accounting for affect’ and ‘building on experience’ is 
found in the perceived ‘foreign-ness’ of the events of September 11th. On 
September 11th, the discrepancy between biocultural expectation and apparent 
reality ensured that the foreign-ness of the events was ‘felt’ before it was put into 
words; the images Americans faced were seen to not belong, and were met with 
corresponding disbelief and denial.  
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In August of 2001, Americans were quite accustomed to seeing images of chaos, 
violence and terrorism elsewhere. Generally, Americans understood that large-
scale (illegitimate) violence was something that happened ‘out there’, in the rest 
of the world, but not ‘here’, not ‘at home’. American security culture located the 
dangers of an anarchical international system beyond both the contemporary 
American era and the physical distance of the world’s two largest oceans 
(Gaddis, 2004). These cultural understandings of violence and space meant that 
the events of September 11th were met with corresponding spatial distanciation. 
Events were viewed as likely ‘news from some other country’ (Castello, 2001).  
 
For Croft, on September 11th 2001, ‘the violence outside … spilled over into the 
American inside’ (Croft, 2006: 37). While violence may be ‘so much an everyday 
event for so much of the world’, it was unusual in the American Homeland and 
was correspondingly viewed as being sourced from beyond America’s borders, in 
the kind of places where violence belonged more naturally (Ibid.). What shocked 
viewers was not the images of violence in and of themselves, but that (slowly) 
they had to reconcile these images with the knowledge that the events were not 
taking place elsewhere, but rather were unfolding in America. This difficulty in 
reconciling the proximal location with the scale of violence fostered much of the 
incomprehension that characterised the initial reactions of many watching 
Americans. 
“I can’t believe it … it’s happening here, in the US. You see these things out 
there, but not here in your own country” (Senor, 2001). 
“I’m still in a state of shock; I don’t believe this could happen on American 
soil” (Farley, 2001). 
 19 
Occurring in America made the events hard to comprehend. The familiarity of the 
New York skyline and the World Trade Center buildings juxtaposed the 
unfamiliarity of witnessing violence ‘at home’.2 The foreign-ness of the events 
was experienced before the process of naming and locating an external enemy 
had taken place (e.g. Ross, 2006). Slowly, as the official narration and naming 
took hold and, amplified by media punditry, the meaning of the events slowly 
harmonised around Bush’s clarion calls, the same questions started to appear. 
Foremost amongst these questions was, ‘why do they hate us?’ Ground Zero 
came to represent the point at which the violence and fanaticism of the outside 
had somehow permeated the usually secure borders of the American inside: the 
point at which external hatred tore at the heart of a loving America. That ‘the 
very worst’ in the world were seen to have struck a blow against ‘the very best’ 
relied, of course, on the particular framing of the events put forward by the Bush 
Administration and a particular security culture centred around American 
exceptionalism (e.g. Bush, 2001). While foreign-ness was ‘felt’ before it was 
articulated, the official narration of ‘9/11’ accounted for the ‘feeling’ that events 
did not belong, juxtaposing them with a naturalised patriotism. Binaries of love 
and hate, inside and outside, America and Afghanistan, good and evil, us and 
them, were central to the official construction of ‘9/11’ and built upon the 
affective experience of September 11th as a foreign, external and wholly ‘Other’ 
event. 
 
(ii) 9/11 as Temporal Rupture 
                                                        
2 Of course, this ‘unfamiliarity’ relied upon particular discursive constructions of 
violence. 
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Parallel to the difficult realisation that events were occurring in the United States 
came the struggle to accept that something like this could occur in the present 
era. As one witness recalled, experiencing temporal distanciation, it was like 
watching ‘something in history’ (Waters, 2001). What seemed immediately clear 
to viewers was that something had changed and what had gone before was 
unlikely to ever be fully restored. This transition was felt at a fundamental level. 
Witnesses and interviewees immediately spoke of an era of invulnerability and 
American exceptionalism in the past tense (Grayson, 2001). And they 
acknowledged that, going forward, the innocence, naivety and safety of that era 
was unlikely to return. ‘Just as susceptible to mass devastation as any other part 
of the world’, Americans watched the events of September 11th 2001 with the 
realisation that they ‘were no longer chosen people’ (Anderson, 2001). Before 
the articulation of the terrorist threat and harbouring states was undertaken by 
the Bush Administration – before Americans were told what would come next – 
they were already aware that what they had before was now gone. Temporal 
rupture was experienced before it was articulated. It was experienced as the 
dusk of a blissful era and articulated as the dawn of new and dangerous times 
(Bush, 2001; Hay, 1996). The political effect of this articulation was to demand 
and legitimise new and unprecedented policy options in response.  
 
 (iii) 9/11 as Beyond Understanding 
A third useful example of the relationship between experience and construction, 
as well as the resonance that a cogent relationship can generate, is found in the 
notion that ‘9/11’ was beyond understanding. The incomprehensibility that 
characterised the experience of September 11th for many Americans was artfully 
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reworked into inexplicability in the official construction of ‘9/11’. Whilst crucially 
distinct, this framing was projected back onto the experience of September 11th 
to seamlessly explain and account for biocultural feelings of incomprehension. 
Culturally informed incomprehension was replaced with a politically efficacious 
inexplicability, which transformed September 11th from a series of events 
beyond understanding into ‘9/11’: a series of events that cannot be justified or 
explained.  
 
Consider, again, the example of one interviewee claiming that they ‘felt nothing’ 
because they ‘couldn’t understand’ (Sato, 2001). Official constructions accounted 
for the prevalent experience of September 11th as beyond understanding, by 
providing Americans with a ready-made reason explaining, justifying and 
validating their inability to comprehend: the actions of terrorists are motivated 
by a pure and perverse evil beyond the realm of comprehension for ordinary, 
loving Americans and beyond justification in a modern, loving United States. In 
both the biocultural experience and discursive construction, September 11th and 
‘9/11’ cannot be understood, but in the former the reason for this lies in the 
exceptionality and foreign-ness of the events themselves, whereas in the latter 
the reason lays in the motivations of terrorists. This particular element of official 
narratives of ‘9/11’ was resonant as it accounted for, explained and verified an 
affective response that struggled to understand and rationalise the events. It was 
politically effective as feelings of the events as ‘beyond understanding’ in 
experiences of September 11th were shifted to focus on the construction of an 
enemy in dominant narratives of ‘9/11’. Official constructions of the enemy as 
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beyond understanding – as pure evil – helped to render particular policy 
responses natural, whilst others unthinkable.  
 
 (iv) 9/11 as Attack on a ‘Way of Life’ 
A fourth useful example of this process of embedding official constructions of 
‘9/11’ in the affective biocultural experience of September 11th is found in 
appeals to ‘ways of life’. Official narratives that spoke of an attack on a way of life 
may have sounded odd or even meaningless to non-American ears, but in a 
nation that experienced a profound sense of trauma, as life ceased to operate 
along the lines cultural expectations demanded (Edkins 2003), such narratives 
helped to fill the awkward and uneasy void in meaning generated by September 
11th (Campbell, 2001; Holland, 2009; Nabers, 2009). For many Americans, on 
September 11th the certainties of American security culture were seen to no 
longer hold true; cultural expectations about how the world should work and 
America’s place in that world were invalidated. Appealing to the notion of an 
attack on a way of life, the Bush administration acknowledged this biocultural 
experience of the failure of the everyday. Again, official constructions of ‘9/11’ 
resonated as they accounted for and explained prominent experiences of the 
events of September 11th. And, again, they posed important political implications 
as appeals to a ‘way of life’ served to naturalise its defence overseas. 
 
As with appeals to a ‘way of life’ and notions of ‘9/11’ as ‘beyond understanding’, 
it is in the relationship between the experience of September 11th and the 
construction of ‘9/11’ that we can begin to understand the intensity of attempts 
to defend dominant official constructions of ‘9/11’ in the decade since. 
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Biocultural experience was actively incorporated into official constructions. It 
was more than the influence of the presidential ‘bully pulpit’ that facilitated 
resonance. Rather, as Americans bought into a discourse that readily accounted 
for the affective experience of 9/11 – an often traumatic and uneasy void of 
meaning – they became particularly invested in the official narration offered by 
the Bush Administration (and which subsequently rippled throughout American 
society and culture). The resonance and endurance of this production was aided 
by its ability to account for, articulate and explain the initial affective experience 
of September 11th for many Americans. And, this framing posed important 
political ramifications in enabling, shaping and constraining the official response 
to the events.  
 
The Politics of Affect: Resonance and Affective Investment 
The affective experience of 9/11 for individual citizens was enabled by a mixture 
of biology and widespread American security culture that formed a background 
against which events would be experienced and assessed, before conscious 
thought and categorisation took place. Instantaneous ‘understandings’ – of 
shock; of the events not belonging; of ‘feeling’ the events as a moment of rupture; 
and of them invalidating the predictable normality of a usual way of life – were 
all part of the affective experience of September 11th conditioned by American 
security culture. The Bush Administration adeptly incorporated these 
experiences within official constructions such that Americans became affectively 
invested within them. Moreover, these constructions accounted for affective 
experiences and plugged back into the broader cultural context thus facilitating 
its embeddedness within American society (Croft, 2006; Jackson, 2005). By 
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accounting for affect and plugging into the cultural context, the war on terror 
discourse produced a resonant official construction of 9/11, with which it was 
difficult to argue (Krebs and Lobasz, 2007). In each type of affective experience, 
the discourse helped to account for it, and sculpted it, through its inclusion into a 
particular yet contingent and contestable narrative. It was not obvious that an 
affective experience of 9/11 as ‘foreign’, as a temporal rupture, or as 
incomprehensible should lead naturally into a policy of intervention abroad. 
Why was 9/11 not understood as a criminal act or crime against humanity 
thereby making more thinkable policy options of isolation, diplomacy or greater 
development aid, given the varying foreign policy traditions with the US?. These 
constructions served a key political function to render a contingent and 
contestable policy response as natural, logical, imperative and even unavoidable. 
More than simply discursive construction, affect – more than the mere 
articulation of words themselves – was central to the resonance of such enabling 
constructions.  
 
In this sense, this approach to biocultural affect, discourse, and emotion extends 
beyond a number of state-level analyses of emotions in IR.  In doing so, it helps to 
more vividly draw attention to the politics of the affect-emotion relationship.  For 
instance, take Löwenheim and Heimann’s (2008) insightful study on revenge in 
international politics. They rightly argue that revenge is an emotional dynamic 
that contributes to specific political outcomes, and develop a theory of how 
states may experience revenge. As they argue, “corporate actors can experience 
emotions through the individuals that compose them, identify with them, and are 
constituted by them”.  Leaders, acting as state agents, “possess emotions that are 
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distinct from their personal emotions because of their institutional capacity and 
embeddedness” (Ibid.: 690). From another angle, Hall develops a state-level 
theory of diplomatic displays of anger. For him, “state actors – ranging from top 
leaders, policymakers, officials, and diplomats, to low-ranking soldiers – can 
collectively project an image of anger through their discourse, symbolic gestures, 
and concrete actions” (Hall, 2011: 532). Sasley critiques yet builds upon these 
approaches to develop an understanding of state-level emotions by drawing 
upon intergroup emotions theory. For Sasley (2011: 453-454), better theorizing 
how states’ may experience emotion – and thereby gaining new analytic leverage 
over the field’s traditional unit of analysis – may lead to increased acceptance of 
emotions research in IR. As he argues, focusing on the state as a monolithic actor 
does not account for the variety of emotional responses within a state, and 
focusing on individual leaders as representatives of the state, while useful, may 
be too specific to develop generalizable theories of emotion. While each of these 
studies rigorously theorize (in different ways) the various relationships between 
states and emotions, their focus nevertheless downplays the capacities of elite-
level discourses to channel (without of course “controlling”) affective responses 
into particular emotional directions. And while we follow Sasley’s theorizing 
states not as black boxes but as social groups that experience emotions, our work 
analyzes the prior ontological step of moving from initial biocultural affective 
reactions to events to the more defined emotional responses that Sasley rightly 
conceptualizes. Such intra-state processes of biocultural affective dynamics are 
constitutive in producing and sustaining widespread understandings of political 
contexts themselves – the often indistinct affective contexts out of which more 
defined emotions are articulated. Examining not just elite discourses but how 
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such discourses resonate with mass-level feelings and affective reactions to 
events promises to enhance our understanding of both the efficacy of political 
discourses and how everyday-level affects can become transformed into 
politically consequential emotional effects. 
The crux of our argument lies in the process of naming affect as emotion. 
Influence over the discursive conditions of emergence, for affect to be named as 
emotion, often lies in the hands of states. As happened after September 11th, 
citizens are told what they experienced. Americans were told that their 
experience of September 11th as ‘foreign’ could be understood as the emotion of 
‘anger’ that naturally followed an act of war declared by an external enemy. They 
were told that the experience of ‘rupture’ and change could be understood 
through the knowledge that America had now entered an era of war. They were 
told that incomprehension could be explained by the fact that events were 
inexplicable. And, they were told that experiencing the events as totally out-of-
the-ordinary was in keeping with terrorist desires to attack our ‘way of life’. The 
affective experience of September 11th – which centred on themes such as 
numbness, confusion, a lack, and rupture – was named, through official 
discourse, around emotions such as anger, sadness, sorrow, love and patriotism. 
This capacity to account for affect and build upon experience should be 
incorporated into constructivist and discourse analytic works attempting to both 
theoretically understand and empirically account for the political possibility of 




The main contribution that this paper offers is that foreign policy, whilst 
discursive and culturally embedded, also must affectively resonate to be 
perceived as legitimate (Holland 2013). Foreign policy is bioculturally 
embedded. Moreover, the political possibility of foreign policy, particularly 
following traumatic events, is partially determined by its construction in terms 
that account for the biocultural landscape such events are seen and felt to carve 
out. If there is a disconnect between official foreign policy discourse and the 
prevalent affect experience of citizens – if they are ‘felt’ and perceived to be 
incommensurate – it is likely to be difficult to realise or sustain foreign policy in 
the short, medium or long term. Take, for instance, a hypothetical situation in 
which the Bush Administration opted to ignore the predominant affective 
experience of Americans and chose instead to articulate a foreign policy that 
emphasised the continued invulnerability of Americans. Such an articulation 
would likely have failed to garner significant public support – and certainly 
would not have cultivated significant affective investment – despite that, in 
actual fact, Americans did and do remain a people who are safer from foreign 
threat than nearly any other (see Mueller, 2006). 
 
Our argument then is that, as well as being discursive and culturally embedded, 
the political possibility of foreign policy is partially determined in its ability to 
affectively invest its audience within it. Affect matters: it influences foreign 
policy discourse, mass responses to it, and helps to constitute collective 
understandings of what foreign policy problems “are” as well as sustaining those 
understandings at a visceral level. Often, however, as was the case after 
September 11th, states retain a quite influential position in their ability to 
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articulate affect as emotion – to name that which citizens ‘felt’. This is certainly 
not always the case, and many important examples exist of states failing to 
articulate their preferred policies to resonate affectively, and where NGOs 
‘shame’ states to pursue a political agenda that they likely would not have 
pursued otherwise (Franklin, 2008). Frequently though, as was the case after 
9/11 and as tends to follow perceived ‘crisis situations’, affect is often what 
states make of it. It is this ability to account for affect that helps to ensure 
resonance and enable policy.  
 
Taking a step back, it is worth remembering that unpicking the fabric of ‘9/11’ is 
crucial to realising its fabricated nature. And this is a task at which International 
Relations has excelled in recent years (e.g. Jackson, 2005). Similarly, recognising 
the resonance and enduring dominance of particular readings of ‘9/11’ rely, in 
turn, on recognising that this fabrication has woven within it the affective 
experience of September 11th. There has been a tendency for analysis to focus on 
the elite-level framings of the Bush administration at the expense of processes of 
meaning production in the general populace. To isolate the two is to limit 
understandings of either, given the intimate relationship between them. A 
decade on from ‘9/11’, it is vital to reconnect these levels of meaning making. 
Taking seriously the experience of the events for ‘normal’ Americans helps us to 
understand the resonance and longevity of dominant narrations, as well as their 
subsequent defence. Analytically, it is important to reconnect the experience of 
September 11th for ordinary Americans with official framings; it is important to 
recognise the (bio)culturally embedded nature of official policy discourse. And, 
normatively, once recognised, it is imperative to unpick the seams that have so 
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effectively stitched together via affect and contingent construction. After 
September 11th, as the Bush Administration retained substantial influence of the 
(re)production of dominant discourses, affect was what the state made of it. Such 
recognition, it is hoped, might be a useful starting point to contest and resist 
dominant framings of ‘9/11’, the ‘War on Terror’ and within other 
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